Abstract-The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is at the root of many sessions-based applications such as VoIP and media streaming that are used by a growing number of users and organizations. The increase of the availability and use of such applications calls for careful attention to the possibility of transferring malformed, incorrect, or malicious SIP messages as they can cause problems ranging from relatively innocuous disturbances to full blown attacks and frauds. To this end, SIP messages are analyzed to be classified as "good" or "bad" depending on whether this structure and content are deemed acceptable or not. This paper presents a classifier of SIP messages based on a two stage filter. The first stage uses a straightforward lexical analyzer to detect and remove all messages that are lexically incorrect with reference to the grammar that is defined by the protocol standard. The second stage uses a machine learning approach based on a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to analyze the structure of the remaining syntactically correct messages in order to detect semantic anomalies which are deemed a strong indication of a possibly malicious message. The SVM "learns" the structure of the "good" and "bad" SIP messages through an initial training phase and the SVM thus configured correctly classifies messages produced by a synthetic generator and also "real" SIP messages that have been collected from the communication network at our institution. The preliminary results of such classification look very promising and are presented in the final section of this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to its flexibility and descriptive power, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is becoming the support not only for Voice over IP (VoIP) and Internet telephony, but also for many other so called session-based applications, such as most multimedia streaming, chats, and many others integrating web-services with telephone and voice. While VoIP and Internet telephony remain the core SIP applications, all those mentioned above have added value and thus have enjoyed rapid acceptance and use, which -in turn -has attracted the attention to the protocol's resilience and security in the presence of incorrect or malformed messages. This is of particular importance for the session-based applications since they appear to be much more sensitive than web services or e-mails to intrusion and mis-functions.
SIP analysis and anomaly detection has thus become an active area of research, as discussed at the end of this section. SIP is a plain, text-based protocol defined by an extensible formal grammar (see RFC 3261 [1] and related documents, i.e., all the RFCs that are cited by and cite it) for the definition and scope of SIP). While SIP might be plain, it is not a simple protocol. Its extensibility, the fact that it must maintain an often complex status of the session, the structure of proxy agents and servers that define the global organization of services like telephony, conferencing, and so forth, make it very sensitive not only to malicious attacks, but also to errors, malformed messages, and incorrect interpretation of the standard. All these factors give raise to an enormous number of possible states which makes conformance testing not feasible (as for most Internet protocols).
The first step in any analysis and anomaly detection process is the control of single messages: are they "good" or "bad"? and most of all . . . how do we define a "good" message? Fig. 1 shows a simple classification tree that introduces the terminology used in this paper. A good message is simply a valid SIP message that can be correctly interpreted by its recipient. This means the message is syntactically correct, semantically meaningful, and comes at the right time to trigger a correct and useful application decision. From a theoretical point of view, bad messages could be identified as the complement of the set of good messages, but this will not help much in the classification process, especially when considering that in realistic cases one needs a fast classification that can be performed in real time over a stream of SIP messages.
In this paper, the set of bad messages comprises malformed, crooked, and malicious messages. Malformed messages are those that simply are syntactically wrong. Crooked messages are those that, while syntactically correct, have no meaning, cannot be interpreted, are ambiguous, or lead to a deadlock, etc. Finally, malicious messages, are those that are correct and meaningful, but will harm the system: normally these are forged on purpose, but they can also be the outcome of malfunctioning devices, badly implemented instances of the protocol or, more likely, of its extensions. Simple binary classification of SIP messages highlighting the terminology used in the paper.
978-1-4673-0921-9/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE Globecom 2012 -Next Generation Networking and Internet Symposium Anomaly detection of a stateful protocol would also require to correlate different messages, e.g., to identify unsolicited calls in telephony, or to identify messages attempting to impersonate another user during a call. However, the first step in traffic analysis is always a message filtering subsystem able to separate bad from good messages. The contribution of this paper is in this direction and to this end a two stage filtering methodology is proposed. The first stage is a lexical analyzer derived directly from the SIP formal grammar specification, while the second stage is based on machine learning techniques, specifically on Support Vector Machines (SVM) [2] .
The first stage identifies all mistakes and malformations that violate the grammar; this is a deterministic and efficient process that is quite straightforward. For the second stage, an SVM has been previously "trained" to classify SIP messages by statistically learning from examples of good an bad messages. Once configured, the SVM can operate at run time by examining the SIP messages that have passed the first stage to identify the majority of crooked and malicious messages.
In addition to the initial description of this simple two-stage architecture, the paper provides insights on the identification and selection of the kernels of the SVM for its efficient implementation, as well as on the its training to achieve a high accuracy in the classification process.
Works on traffic analysis and intrusion detection in general are too numerous for a comprehensive presentation here, so we only consider those issues in the context of SIP, highlighting the different approaches adopted by various researchers.
The basic functionalities of the very popular "signaturebased" network intrusion detection system Snort 1 is extended in [3] , for the anomaly detection in SIP. A specific "signature" considering the syntax of well-formed SIP message is defined in [4] and [5] . Any message that does not comply with that "signature" is considered as malformed and discarded. [6] concentrate specifically on unsolicited calls trying to isolate users that fall outside expected behaviors.
In a manner similar to our own proposal, machine learning techniques have been proposed for SIP messages analysis, like in [7] , [8] , [9] where the anomalous content is identified by parsing SIP messages. Further details and an extended version of this work is found in [10] .
II. FILTERING METHODOLOGY
As mentioned in the introduction, "bad" SIP messages are all those messages that do not belong to a valid, correct and legitimate SIP session. They can be generated when SIP protocol implementations or applications do not fully comply with the standards or they contain errors in the implementation code. In addition, attackers can manipulate SIP messages to take advantage of existing security problems in the target system, or to exploit SIP weak points.
In this paper we have considered various kinds of bad messages, as shown in Fig. 1, comprising LEX SIP can be run on the same machine of the agent, or, if performance requires it, as a kind of firewall in front of it. Fig. 2 shows the architecture of LEX SIP where the first block is the lexical/syntactic 2 analyzer and the second block is the structure and content analyzer.
The work-flow of the two filtering stages are described in following sub-sections.
A. First Stage: Lexical Analyzer
The first stage filtering is performed by the lexical analyzer which investigates each SIP message, extracts from it a sequence of tokens/words that are parsed to determine if they are part of the language generated by the formal grammar which specifies the SIP protocol [1] . The formal syntax of SIP protocol is defined by a context-free grammar specified in Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) 3 , a metalanguage based on Backus-Naur Form (BNF) which is one of the main notation techniques for context-free grammars. Given the formal grammar definition of the SIP protocol (and thus, the syntax of all SIP messages), the implementation of the lexical analyzer is a well defined task that can be realized by using any of the standard tools, for example lex available under Unix, used to parse a language. Unlike in parsing of programming languages, here the processing can be stopped immediately upon detection of the first syntax error rather than continue parsing to the end of that message since there is no need to extract a list of errors present in the whole message.
Before passing them to the next level filtering, the lexical analyzer further processes the syntactically well-formed messages. This process can be thought of as a specialized kind of tokenization, where the token are significant features extracted from the SIP messages which are now represented as vectors in features space.
B. Second Stage: Structure and Content Analyzer
SIP messages that have passed the lexical analyzer filter may still be "bad". For example, Fig. 3 shows a SIP message with an unknown request method, and an unknown URI scheme in the Request-URI. The message is syntactically valid but a server receiving this message will fail to process this type of message and may be perform time-consuming analyses to determine the request message type and the information necessary to route this kind of request. To cull out these bad messages from those syntactically well-formed SIP messages that have been accepted by the lexical analyzer, the second stage filter analyzes the structure and the contents of the messages to flag those that are either crooked or malicious. Any hope of tackling this problem with an algorithmic or table-drive approach is destined to run up against the combinatorial explosion of the cases that need to be considered, as there are endless ways of forming a crooked or malicious message. (there are 14 request message types, 6 response message kinds, there are neither maximum lengths of the headers, nor upper limits for some values, some fields are mandatory while other are optional andfinally -there are multiple ways of structuring a correct SIP message. This results in the practical impossibility of systematically examining all possible cases of corruptioncasual or voluntary -of a message).
An attractive alternative is that of correctly classifying those messages that have a structure and content that appear frequently in a stream of messages. This can be done by applying one of the "supervised machine learning" techniques that recently have found many useful applications in numerous problem areas. The basic idea is to provide a sufficiently rich set of examples with their correct classification and "train" a machine automaton to carry out such classification, even on messages that were never seen before. An added bonus of this approach is in its flexibility to fit new kinds of bad messages that might become common at a later time, perhaps as a new breed of malicious messages is introduced when some weakness of the protocol is uncovered. The adaptation to the changed operating scenario can be obtained simply by retraining the machine automaton while including the new messages, duly identified as bad.
Various approaches to supervised machine learning have been proposed. Recently the so called Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and the Support Vector Machines (SVM) have received much attention since they have performed quite well in a variety of problem contexts. For our second stage filter of LEX SIP we have selected to use an SVM for the reasons that will be discussed below.
Support Vector Machines have been introduced by Vapnik in [11] and have been successfully applied to many fields such as Bio-informatics, Natural Language Processing, Handwritten Character Recognition and many others. Unlike Artificial Neural Networks, SVMs do not have the problem of getting stuck in a local minimum while searching for an optimal configuration of its operating parameters (see for example [2] ). In addition, SVMs are scalable since the computational complexity does not depend on the dimensionality of the input space. Finally, SVMs optimization by training (or re-training) is quite fast, which can represent an important point if onlineintrusion (re)configuration is of paramount importance.
The basic idea of SVM classification is to interpret the d-dimensional feature vectors derived from SIP messages as points in an d-dimensional space. Some of these points correspond to "good" messages (label them as −1) and the others correspond to "bad" messages (label them as +1). The classification problem can be seen as finding an hyperplane that separates the space in two sub-spaces: one containing all the −1 points, the other all the +1 points. If the set of points is linearly separable into two classes, there are infinite planes that will work. Notice, however, that there is only one "best" hyperplane that maximizes the distance between it and the nearest data points of each class. Unfortunately, it is often the case that no such hyperplane exists (the set of points is not linearly separable) and hence some points would be misclassified, as they would lay on the "wrong" side of the best hyperplane. However, while not linearly separable, the points could be separable if some other, more complex, surface were used instead of the (simple) hyperplane. Informally, the SVM computation does this by projecting all points into a higherdimensional space and in that space the complex separating surface becomes a hyperplane, thus linearly separating the set of projected points.
More precisely, given a set of n SIP messages, let x i be the i-th message which is transferred into a d dimensional feature vector and let y i ∈ {−1, +1} be and indicator function where −1 indicates that the i-th message belongs to the class of good message class while +1 indicates that the i-th message is in the bad message class. The equation of the hyperplane separating the training set (
can be defined as:
where w is the vector normal to the hyperplane and b w is the perpendicular distance from the hyperplane to the origin.
For the linearly separable data, SVM finds the optimum separating hyperplane with the largest margin (Fig. 4) by solving the Quadratic Programming (QP) optimization problem described by eq. (2).
Maximum Margin Separating Hyperplane Fig. 4 . Linear Support Vector Machine: optimum separation hyperplane.
Fig. 5. Non-linear SVM: polynomial mapping
If the set of points is not linearly separable, then instead of trying to fit a non-linear model, the set of points can be mapped to a higher-dimensional space by a non-linear mapping function φ, x → φ( x) so that the points become linearly separable in this higher dimensional space.
The classification function in dual space becomes:
In the quadratic optimization problem for non-linearly separable data SVM, the training vectors appear only in the form of dot products, (φ ( x i ) , φ ( x j )) which imply that computationally expensive dot product calculation is needed. However, by using the so called "kernel functions" one can apply a "kernel trick" that avoids the expensive dot products. Kernel functions that have been favored in the recent literature include:
• Radial Basis Functions (RBF) kernels:
Thus, the classification function of eq. (3) becomes:
Fig . 5 represents the polynomial projection of non-linear data into high-dimentional feature space where they are linearly separable.
For our classifier of well-formed SIP messages we have used LibSVM [12] , a freely available library for Support Vector Machines. First, the SVM was trained with a set of 500 pre-classified examples of 40 features 4 derived from a balanced mix of good and bad messages. This training phase determines a configuration of the SVM that will result in a good classification of subsequent messages contained in a test set. The test set contains unlabeled SIP message vectors that are passed from lexical analyzer. Our experimental results shows that SIP message vectors are not linearly separable, so we need to choose a kernel and relevant parameters in the hope that in higher dimension the data would become linearly separable. To this end, experiments were carried out with various kernels and parameters. It was very obvious that the linear kernel did not yield any interesting result and hence the experimentations focused on polynomial kernels of degree 2, 3, and 4 and on RBF kernels. The latter are reported in the literature as leading to good results and so are deemed preferable despite their higher computational cost. However, in the support documents available with LibSVM it is mentioned that in the case of data with a large number of features (as in our case), sometime a low degree polynomial kernel is preferable. Our experiments confirmed the validity of this suggestion -at least for our specific application. The detailed performance results of the various experiments are reported in the next section.
III. RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE
The goal of LEX SIP is to maximize detection accuracy of SIP malformed message, while reducing message processing time since the latter plays a vital role in applicability of an intrusion detection system in a real-time environment like VoIP.
A. Synthetic Traffic Generation
For performance evaluation of LEX SIP a large number of SIP traces would be needed. However, reliable real world VoIP traces are hard to get because of the user privacy agreement of VoIP providers. Furthermore, VoIP traces of malicious messages during an attack are quite infrequent. Considering this situation, we have developed "SIP-Msg-Gen" 5 , a synthetic SIP message generator, capable of generating both "good" or "bad" SIP messages. "SIP-Msg-Gen" is available under GPL license terms. "Good" messages are generated by following the basic parsing constructs of SIP protocols defined in RFC 3261 [1] , while generation of "bad" messages is influenced by SIP torture test messages defined in RFC 4475 [13] and PROTOS test suite 6 .
B. Performance Evaluation
The performance of LEX SIP is measured through efficiency which is defined by the message classification capa-bility, and effectiveness which is the time/effort needed for classification.
The experimental dataset consists of two million SIP messages generated by "SIP-Msg-Gen" where 984,000 are "good" messages and 1,016,000 are "bad" messages. As such balance of "good" and "bad" messages are rare in real traces, the other experiment with real traces (in subsection III-C) shows the classification capability of LEX SIP even when significant imbalance exists between "good" and "bad" messages. Included in the "good" messages there are 123,000 valid "torture" messages to measure the efficiency of lexical analyzer. Among the "bad" messages, 371,482 messages contain syntax error and 644,518 messages are syntactically well-formed but are not meaningful, those that we called "crooked" messages. A detailed description of the composition of the data set is found in [10] . The lexical analyzer of LEX SIP analyzed all messages in the data set and has successfully identified all the 371,482 malformed messages. The remaining 1,628,518 syntactically correct messages were processed to extract from them 40 significant features which were passed on to the second level filter to be classified by the SVM-based structure and content analyzer.
In our work we have used C-SVC, which is a modified maximum margin idea of SVM proposed by Cortes and Vapnik [14] that allows the decision margin to separate the data set with a minimal number of errors (outliers or noisy examples that are inside or on the wrong side of the margin). This method introduces slack variables ξ i which measure the degree of misclassification of the data x i . The corresponding formulation of the SVM optimization problem with slack variables becomes:
By definition, ξ > 0; 0 < ξ ≤ 1 indicates a data point that lies somewhere between the margin and the correct side of hyperplane, while ξ > 1 denotes a misclassified data point. Here C is a regularization parameter defined as "soft margin constant" that controls the trade-off between maximizing the margin and minimizing the training error and is usually thought of as a way to control overfitting. Although SVM is a widely used classifier, effective use of SVM requires an understanding of its parameters and their influence over classification accuracy. In particular, the selection of kernel function and tuning of the kernel parameters (e.g., degree of polynomial kernel, σ for RBF kernel) and soft margin constant C, are very important decisions for classification with SVM. Unfortunately, there is no specific algorithm to select a kernel function, since, much like in other machine learning techniques, this is also data dependent. The user guide of LibSVM [15] suggests to use cross-validation to obtain an estimate the performance of a predictive model with various parameters and then select a specific set of parameters based on these estimates. In search of suitable parameter setting, we have performed a k-fold cross-validation where the idea is to divide the training set into k subsets of equal size (we have used k=5). Each subset is then tested (validated) using the classifier trained on the remaining k−1 subsets using a specific set of parameters. The k results are then combined (e.g. averaged) to obtain a single index. The entire process is repeated for each set of parameters and the set of parameters with the best cross-validation index is finally selected. We have performed this test for three kernel functions (e.g., linear, radial basis function, and polynomial) and various values of the relevant parameters, as shown in Table I . For our analysis we have started with a simple linear kernel, since, having only the soft-margin constant C, it is easier to tune. The linear kernel with the best value of C provided us with a baseline against which we could assess the performance of the other kernels and parameters. Although in general RBF is often recommended despite its higher computational cost, for this particular dataset the RBF kernel was not the most suitable. Table I shows that the crossvalidation accuracy using RBF kernel (with 0 < σ ≤ 1) is very low for small value of C (soft margin constant), though the accuracy increases as the value of C increases. In general, small values of C tend to emphasize the margin while ignoring the outliers in the training data. Conversely, large values of C increase the possibility to overfit the training data. Hence, a small value of soft margin constant C is usually preferable.
Finally, we turned our attention to polynomial kernels of de-
we performed a "grid-search" on two parameters (soft margin constant C, and polynomial degree d) using cross-validation. The performance for various pairs of (C, d) values (C = 2 −1 , 2 0 , 2 2 , 2 3 ... and d = 2, 3, 4, ....) were evaluated through cross-validation. The best combination was obtained for the pair, indicating that a second degree polynomial flexible enough to discriminate between the two classes with a reasonably small soft margin.
Results produced by SVM classifier are found in performance of classification. The average time for LEX SIP to classify a SIP message is 0.45 millisec/msg. This time is the aggregation of processing time of individual filtering stage. It is found that about 0.35 millisec/msg time is requred for lexical analyzer to perform syntax checking of a SIP message and the remaining time is required for classification with SVM. All experiments are done in a machine of Intel Core i7 CPU, 2.0 GHz Quad-core and 8 GB RAM memory.
C. Preliminary Test with Real Traffic
The final goal of a classifier is working with real trafficpossibly on-line. To this end, we established an agreement with our institution that allowed us to start collecting SIP traces by mirroring the port in front of the SIP Proxy server. Due to privacy issues, so far we could only collect very few messages (less than 20,000), but anonymized data collection is on its way for future use. The lexical analyzer successfully passed all the messages as syntactically well-formed messages towards the classifier for next level filtering. Performance of LEX SIP on real SIP traces is summarized in Table IV. IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK In this paper, a two-stage filtering approach is proposed for SIP anomalous message detection. The first stage is a straightforward lexical analyzer, whose goal, besides controlling the validity of the message syntax, is the extraction of relevant features to be used by the second stage, a supervised classifier. As a supervised classifier, we have selected an SVM. The advantages of the SVM is that very few parameters are required for tuning the learning machine and a small sample set can build the model to classify huge unlabeled dataset. The selection of features to use for the classification, albeit not discussed in detail in this paper for lack of space, is fundamental for efficient and precise classification. The results obtained both with artificial traces, and with an initial set of real-traffic traces collected in the production network of our University, are very promising, leading to extremely accurate classification.
Future work includes extended analysis of real traces, as well as deeper insight on feature extraction. Moreover, the possibility of defining a methodology for on-line continuous training of the SVM will be explored in the attempt of realizing an autonomic, self-training system for SIP message classification.
